1020 lines
31 KiB
C
1020 lines
31 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: x509_policy.c,v 1.25 2023/04/28 16:30:14 tb Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2022, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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*/
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/stack.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "x509_internal.h"
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#include "x509_local.h"
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/* XXX move to proper place */
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#define X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION 201
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/*
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* This file computes the X.509 policy tree, as described in RFC 5280, section
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* 6.1. It differs in that:
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*
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* (1) It does not track "qualifier_set". This is not needed as it is not
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* output by this implementation.
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*
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* (2) It builds a directed acyclic graph, rather than a tree. When a given
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* policy matches multiple parents, RFC 5280 makes a separate node for
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* each parent. This representation condenses them into one node with
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* multiple parents. Thus we refer to this structure as a "policy graph",
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* rather than a "policy tree".
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*
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* (3) "expected_policy_set" is not tracked explicitly and built temporarily
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* as part of building the graph.
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*
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* (4) anyPolicy nodes are not tracked explicitly.
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*
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* (5) Some pruning steps are deferred to when policies are evaluated, as a
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* reachability pass.
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*/
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/*
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* An X509_POLICY_NODE is a node in the policy graph. It corresponds to a node
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* from RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, step (a), but we store some fields differently.
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*/
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typedef struct x509_policy_node_st {
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/* policy is the "valid_policy" field from RFC 5280. */
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ASN1_OBJECT *policy;
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/*
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* parent_policies, if non-empty, is the list of "valid_policy" values
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* for all nodes which are a parent of this node. In this case, no entry
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* in this list will be anyPolicy. This list is in no particular order
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* and may contain duplicates if the corresponding certificate had
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* duplicate mappings.
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*
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* If empty, this node has a single parent, anyPolicy. The node is then
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* a root policies, and is in authorities-constrained-policy-set if it
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* has a path to a leaf node.
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*
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* Note it is not possible for a policy to have both anyPolicy and a
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* concrete policy as a parent. Section 6.1.3, step (d.1.ii) only runs
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* if there was no match in step (d.1.i). We do not need to represent a
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* parent list of, say, {anyPolicy, OID1, OID2}.
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*/
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STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *parent_policies;
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/*
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* mapped is one if this node matches a policy mapping in the
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* certificate and zero otherwise.
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*/
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int mapped;
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/*
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* reachable is one if this node is reachable from some valid policy in
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* the end-entity certificate. It is computed during |has_explicit_policy|.
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*/
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int reachable;
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} X509_POLICY_NODE;
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DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE)
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new(X509_POLICY_NODE, (cmp))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(X509_POLICY_NODE)
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(st) SKM_sk_free(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(st) SKM_sk_num(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (i))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (i), (val))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(st, val) SKM_sk_push(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_unshift(st, val) SKM_sk_unshift(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(st, val) SKM_sk_find(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find_ex(st, val) SKM_sk_find_ex(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (i))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_ptr(st, ptr) SKM_sk_delete_ptr(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (ptr))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_insert(st, val, i) SKM_sk_insert(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (val), (i))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (cmp))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup(X509_POLICY_NODE, st)
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st), (free_func))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(X509_POLICY_NODE, (st))
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/*
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* An X509_POLICY_LEVEL is the collection of nodes at the same depth in the
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* policy graph. This structure can also be used to represent a level's
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* "expected_policy_set" values. See |process_policy_mappings|.
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*/
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typedef struct x509_policy_level_st {
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/*
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* nodes is the list of nodes at this depth, except for the anyPolicy
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* node, if any. This list is sorted by policy OID for efficient lookup.
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*/
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STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
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/*
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* has_any_policy is one if there is an anyPolicy node at this depth,
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* and zero otherwise.
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*/
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int has_any_policy;
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} X509_POLICY_LEVEL;
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DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL)
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_new(cmp) SKM_sk_new(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (cmp))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_new_null() SKM_sk_new_null(X509_POLICY_LEVEL)
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_free(st) SKM_sk_free(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(st) SKM_sk_num(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(st, i) SKM_sk_value(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (i))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_set(st, i, val) SKM_sk_set(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (i), (val))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_push(st, val) SKM_sk_push(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_unshift(st, val) SKM_sk_unshift(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_find(st, val) SKM_sk_find(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_find_ex(st, val) SKM_sk_find_ex(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (i))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_delete_ptr(st, ptr) SKM_sk_delete_ptr(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (ptr))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_insert(st, val, i) SKM_sk_insert(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (val), (i))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (cmp))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, st)
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st), (free_func))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st))
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#define sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(X509_POLICY_LEVEL, (st))
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/*
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* Don't look Ethel, but you would really not want to look if we did
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* this the OpenSSL way either, and we are not using this boringsslism
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* anywhere else. Callers should ensure that the stack in data is sorted.
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*/
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void
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sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes,
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int (*delete_if)(X509_POLICY_NODE *, void *), void *data)
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{
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_STACK *sk = (_STACK *)nodes;
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
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int new_num = 0;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) {
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
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if (!delete_if(node, data))
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sk->data[new_num++] = (char *)node;
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}
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sk->num = new_num;
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}
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static int
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is_any_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
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{
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return OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_any_policy;
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}
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static void
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x509_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
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{
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if (node == NULL)
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return;
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ASN1_OBJECT_free(node->policy);
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sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(node->parent_policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
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free(node);
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}
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static X509_POLICY_NODE *
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x509_policy_node_new(const ASN1_OBJECT *policy)
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{
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node = NULL;
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if (is_any_policy(policy))
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goto err;
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if ((node = calloc(1, sizeof(*node))) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if ((node->policy = OBJ_dup(policy)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if ((node->parent_policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()) == NULL)
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goto err;
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return node;
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err:
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x509_policy_node_free(node);
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return NULL;
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}
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static int
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x509_policy_node_cmp(const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *a,
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const X509_POLICY_NODE *const *b)
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{
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return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policy, (*b)->policy);
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}
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static void
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x509_policy_level_free(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level)
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{
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if (level == NULL)
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return;
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sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(level->nodes, x509_policy_node_free);
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free(level);
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}
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static X509_POLICY_LEVEL *
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x509_policy_level_new(void)
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{
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X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
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if ((level = calloc(1, sizeof(*level))) == NULL)
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goto err;
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level->nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new(x509_policy_node_cmp);
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if (level->nodes == NULL)
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goto err;
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return level;
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err:
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x509_policy_level_free(level);
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return NULL;
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}
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static int
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x509_policy_level_is_empty(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level)
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{
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if (level->has_any_policy)
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return 0;
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return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes) == 0;
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}
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static void
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x509_policy_level_clear(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level)
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{
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
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int i;
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level->has_any_policy = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
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node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i);
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x509_policy_node_free(node);
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}
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sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_zero(level->nodes);
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}
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/*
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* x509_policy_level_find returns the node in |level| corresponding to |policy|,
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* or NULL if none exists. Callers should ensure that level->nodes is sorted
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* to avoid the cost of sorting it in sk_find().
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*/
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static X509_POLICY_NODE *
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x509_policy_level_find(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, const ASN1_OBJECT *policy)
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{
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X509_POLICY_NODE node;
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node.policy = (ASN1_OBJECT *)policy;
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int idx;
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if ((idx = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(level->nodes, &node)) < 0)
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return NULL;
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return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, idx);
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}
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/*
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* x509_policy_level_add_nodes adds the nodes in |nodes| to |level|. It returns
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* one on success and zero on error. No policy in |nodes| may already be present
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* in |level|. This function modifies |nodes| to avoid making a copy, but the
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* caller is still responsible for releasing |nodes| itself.
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*
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* This function is used to add nodes to |level| in bulk, and avoid resorting
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* |level| after each addition.
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*/
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static int
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x509_policy_level_add_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
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STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) {
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
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if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(level->nodes, node))
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return 0;
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sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_set(nodes, i, NULL);
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}
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sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(level->nodes);
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return 1;
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}
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static int
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policyinfo_cmp(const POLICYINFO *const *a,
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const POLICYINFO *const *b)
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{
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return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policyid, (*b)->policyid);
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}
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static int
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delete_if_not_in_policies(X509_POLICY_NODE *node, void *data)
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{
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const CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies = data;
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POLICYINFO info;
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info.policyid = node->policy;
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if (sk_POLICYINFO_find(policies, &info) >= 0)
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return 0;
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x509_policy_node_free(node);
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return 1;
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}
|
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|
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/*
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* process_certificate_policies updates |level| to incorporate |x509|'s
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* certificate policies extension. This implements steps (d) and (e) of RFC
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* 5280, section 6.1.3. |level| must contain the previous level's
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* "expected_policy_set" information. For all but the top-most level, this is
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* the output of |process_policy_mappings|. |any_policy_allowed| specifies
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* whether anyPolicy is allowed or inhibited, taking into account the exception
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* for self-issued certificates.
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*/
|
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static int
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process_certificate_policies(const X509 *x509, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
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int any_policy_allowed)
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{
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STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *new_nodes = NULL;
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CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies;
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const POLICYINFO *policy;
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X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
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int cert_has_any_policy, critical, i, previous_level_has_any_policy;
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int ret = 0;
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|
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policies = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_certificate_policies, &critical,
|
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NULL);
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if (policies == NULL) {
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if (critical != -1)
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return 0; /* Syntax error in the extension. */
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|
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/* RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (e). */
|
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x509_policy_level_clear(level);
|
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return 1;
|
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}
|
|
|
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/*
|
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* certificatePolicies may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4.
|
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* TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
|
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*/
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if (sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) == 0) {
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X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
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goto err;
|
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}
|
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|
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(void)sk_POLICYINFO_set_cmp_func(policies, policyinfo_cmp);
|
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sk_POLICYINFO_sort(policies);
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cert_has_any_policy = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) {
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policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i);
|
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if (is_any_policy(policy->policyid))
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cert_has_any_policy = 1;
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if (i > 0 &&
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OBJ_cmp(sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i - 1)->policyid,
|
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policy->policyid) == 0) {
|
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/*
|
|
* Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4, |policies| may not
|
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* have duplicates.
|
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*/
|
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X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
|
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goto err;
|
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}
|
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}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This does the same thing as RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (d),
|
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* though in a slighty different order. |level| currently contains
|
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* "expected_policy_set" values of the previous level.
|
|
* See |process_policy_mappings| for details.
|
|
*/
|
|
previous_level_has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* First, we handle steps (d.1.i) and (d.2). The net effect of these
|
|
* two steps is to intersect |level| with |policies|, ignoring
|
|
* anyPolicy if it is inhibited.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!cert_has_any_policy || !any_policy_allowed) {
|
|
if (!sk_POLICYINFO_is_sorted(policies))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes,
|
|
delete_if_not_in_policies, policies);
|
|
level->has_any_policy = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Step (d.1.ii) may attach new nodes to the previous level's anyPolicy
|
|
* node.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (previous_level_has_any_policy) {
|
|
new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
|
|
if (new_nodes == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) {
|
|
policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Though we've reordered the steps slightly, |policy|
|
|
* is in |level| if and only if it would have been a
|
|
* match in step (d.1.ii).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_any_policy(policy->policyid))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(level->nodes))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (x509_policy_level_find(level, policy->policyid) != NULL)
|
|
continue;
|
|
node = x509_policy_node_new(policy->policyid);
|
|
if (node == NULL ||
|
|
!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes, node)) {
|
|
x509_policy_node_free(node);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!x509_policy_level_add_nodes(level, new_nodes))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(new_nodes, x509_policy_node_free);
|
|
CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_free(policies);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
compare_issuer_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING *const *a,
|
|
const POLICY_MAPPING *const *b)
|
|
{
|
|
return OBJ_cmp((*a)->issuerDomainPolicy, (*b)->issuerDomainPolicy);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
compare_subject_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING *const *a,
|
|
const POLICY_MAPPING *const *b)
|
|
{
|
|
return OBJ_cmp((*a)->subjectDomainPolicy, (*b)->subjectDomainPolicy);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
delete_if_mapped(X509_POLICY_NODE *node, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
const POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings = data;
|
|
POLICY_MAPPING mapping;
|
|
mapping.issuerDomainPolicy = node->policy;
|
|
if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_find(mappings, &mapping) < 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
x509_policy_node_free(node);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* process_policy_mappings processes the policy mappings extension of |cert|,
|
|
* whose corresponding graph level is |level|. |mapping_allowed| specifies
|
|
* whether policy mapping is inhibited at this point. On success, it returns an
|
|
* |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| containing the "expected_policy_set" for |level|. On
|
|
* error, it returns NULL. This implements steps (a) and (b) of RFC 5280,
|
|
* section 6.1.4.
|
|
*
|
|
* We represent the "expected_policy_set" as an |X509_POLICY_LEVEL|.
|
|
* |has_any_policy| indicates whether there is an anyPolicy node with
|
|
* "expected_policy_set" of {anyPolicy}. If a node with policy oid P1 contains
|
|
* P2 in its "expected_policy_set", the level will contain a node of policy P2
|
|
* with P1 in |parent_policies|.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is equivalent to the |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| that would result if the next
|
|
* certificats contained anyPolicy. |process_certificate_policies| will filter
|
|
* this result down to compute the actual level.
|
|
*/
|
|
static X509_POLICY_LEVEL *
|
|
process_policy_mappings(const X509 *cert,
|
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
|
|
int mapping_allowed)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *new_nodes = NULL;
|
|
POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings;
|
|
const ASN1_OBJECT *last_policy;
|
|
POLICY_MAPPING *mapping;
|
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *next = NULL;
|
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
|
|
int critical, i;
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
mappings = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_policy_mappings, &critical, NULL);
|
|
if (mappings == NULL && critical != -1) {
|
|
/* Syntax error in the policy mappings extension. */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mappings != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* PolicyMappings may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.5.
|
|
* TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into
|
|
* the parser.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings) == 0) {
|
|
X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (a). */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) {
|
|
mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i);
|
|
if (is_any_policy(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) ||
|
|
is_any_policy(mapping->subjectDomainPolicy))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sort to group by issuerDomainPolicy. */
|
|
(void)sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings,
|
|
compare_issuer_policy);
|
|
sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings);
|
|
|
|
if (mapping_allowed) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Mark nodes as mapped, and add any nodes to |level|
|
|
* which may be needed as part of RFC 5280,
|
|
* section 6.1.4, step (b.1).
|
|
*/
|
|
new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
|
|
if (new_nodes == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
last_policy = NULL;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) {
|
|
mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i);
|
|
/*
|
|
* There may be multiple mappings with the same
|
|
* |issuerDomainPolicy|.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (last_policy != NULL &&
|
|
OBJ_cmp(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy,
|
|
last_policy) == 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
last_policy = mapping->issuerDomainPolicy;
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(level->nodes))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
node = x509_policy_level_find(level,
|
|
mapping->issuerDomainPolicy);
|
|
if (node == NULL) {
|
|
if (!level->has_any_policy)
|
|
continue;
|
|
node = x509_policy_node_new(
|
|
mapping->issuerDomainPolicy);
|
|
if (node == NULL ||
|
|
!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes,
|
|
node)) {
|
|
x509_policy_node_free(node);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
node->mapped = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!x509_policy_level_add_nodes(level, new_nodes))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.2). If mapping is
|
|
* inhibited, delete all mapped nodes.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!sk_POLICY_MAPPING_is_sorted(mappings))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes,
|
|
delete_if_mapped, mappings);
|
|
sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(mappings,
|
|
POLICY_MAPPING_free);
|
|
mappings = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If a node was not mapped, it retains the original "explicit_policy_set"
|
|
* value, itself. Add those to |mappings|.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mappings == NULL) {
|
|
mappings = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_new_null();
|
|
if (mappings == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
|
|
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i);
|
|
if (!node->mapped) {
|
|
mapping = POLICY_MAPPING_new();
|
|
if (mapping == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
mapping->issuerDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node->policy);
|
|
mapping->subjectDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node->policy);
|
|
if (mapping->issuerDomainPolicy == NULL ||
|
|
mapping->subjectDomainPolicy == NULL ||
|
|
!sk_POLICY_MAPPING_push(mappings, mapping)) {
|
|
POLICY_MAPPING_free(mapping);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sort to group by subjectDomainPolicy. */
|
|
(void)sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings, compare_subject_policy);
|
|
sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings);
|
|
|
|
/* Convert |mappings| to our "expected_policy_set" representation. */
|
|
next = x509_policy_level_new();
|
|
if (next == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
next->has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy;
|
|
|
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *last_node = NULL;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) {
|
|
mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Skip mappings where |issuerDomainPolicy| does not appear in
|
|
* the graph.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!level->has_any_policy) {
|
|
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(level->nodes))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (x509_policy_level_find(level,
|
|
mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) == NULL)
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (last_node == NULL ||
|
|
OBJ_cmp(last_node->policy, mapping->subjectDomainPolicy) !=
|
|
0) {
|
|
last_node = x509_policy_node_new(
|
|
mapping->subjectDomainPolicy);
|
|
if (last_node == NULL ||
|
|
!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(next->nodes, last_node)) {
|
|
x509_policy_node_free(last_node);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(last_node->parent_policies,
|
|
mapping->issuerDomainPolicy))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
mapping->issuerDomainPolicy = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(next->nodes);
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
x509_policy_level_free(next);
|
|
next = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(mappings, POLICY_MAPPING_free);
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(new_nodes, x509_policy_node_free);
|
|
return next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* apply_skip_certs, if |skip_certs| is non-NULL, sets |*value| to the minimum
|
|
* of its current value and |skip_certs|. It returns one on success and zero if
|
|
* |skip_certs| is negative.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
apply_skip_certs(const ASN1_INTEGER *skip_certs, size_t *value)
|
|
{
|
|
if (skip_certs == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser. */
|
|
if (skip_certs->type & V_ASN1_NEG) {
|
|
X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If |skip_certs| does not fit in |uint64_t|, it must exceed |*value|. */
|
|
uint64_t u64;
|
|
if (ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&u64, skip_certs) && u64 < *value)
|
|
*value = (size_t)u64;
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* process_policy_constraints updates |*explicit_policy|, |*policy_mapping|, and
|
|
* |*inhibit_any_policy| according to |x509|'s policy constraints and inhibit
|
|
* anyPolicy extensions. It returns one on success and zero on error. This
|
|
* implements steps (i) and (j) of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
process_policy_constraints(const X509 *x509, size_t *explicit_policy,
|
|
size_t *policy_mapping,
|
|
size_t *inhibit_any_policy)
|
|
{
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER *inhibit_any_policy_ext;
|
|
POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *constraints;
|
|
int critical;
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
constraints = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_policy_constraints, &critical,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
if (constraints == NULL && critical != -1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (constraints != NULL) {
|
|
if (constraints->requireExplicitPolicy == NULL &&
|
|
constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.11, at least one of the
|
|
* fields must be
|
|
*/
|
|
X509error(X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
|
|
POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(constraints);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ok = apply_skip_certs(constraints->requireExplicitPolicy,
|
|
explicit_policy) &&
|
|
apply_skip_certs(constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping,
|
|
policy_mapping);
|
|
POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(constraints);
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
inhibit_any_policy_ext = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_inhibit_any_policy,
|
|
&critical, NULL);
|
|
if (inhibit_any_policy_ext == NULL && critical != -1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ok = apply_skip_certs(inhibit_any_policy_ext, inhibit_any_policy);
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER_free(inhibit_any_policy_ext);
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* has_explicit_policy returns one if the set of authority-space policy OIDs
|
|
* |levels| has some non-empty intersection with |user_policies|, and zero
|
|
* otherwise. This mirrors the logic in RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). This
|
|
* function modifies |levels| and should only be called at the end of policy
|
|
* evaluation.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
has_explicit_policy(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels,
|
|
const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, *prev;
|
|
X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *parent;
|
|
int num_levels, user_has_any_policy;
|
|
int i, j, k;
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_is_sorted(user_policies))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Step (g.i). If the policy graph is empty, the intersection is empty. */
|
|
num_levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(levels);
|
|
level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, num_levels - 1);
|
|
if (x509_policy_level_is_empty(level))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If |user_policies| is empty, we interpret it as having a single
|
|
* anyPolicy value. The caller may also have supplied anyPolicy
|
|
* explicitly.
|
|
*/
|
|
user_has_any_policy = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies) <= 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies); i++) {
|
|
if (is_any_policy(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(user_policies, i))) {
|
|
user_has_any_policy = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Step (g.ii). If the policy graph is not empty and the user set
|
|
* contains anyPolicy, the intersection is the entire (non-empty) graph.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (user_has_any_policy)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Step (g.iii) does not delete anyPolicy nodes, so if the graph has
|
|
* anyPolicy, some explicit policy will survive. The actual intersection
|
|
* may synthesize some nodes in step (g.iii.3), but we do not return the
|
|
* policy list itself, so we skip actually computing this.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (level->has_any_policy)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We defer pruning the tree, so as we look for nodes with parent
|
|
* anyPolicy, step (g.iii.1), we must limit to nodes reachable from the
|
|
* bottommost level. Start by marking each of those nodes as reachable.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++)
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i)->reachable = 1;
|
|
|
|
for (i = num_levels - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, i);
|
|
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); j++) {
|
|
node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, j);
|
|
if (!node->reachable)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(node->parent_policies) == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* |node|'s parent is anyPolicy and is part of
|
|
* "valid_policy_node_set". If it exists in
|
|
* |user_policies|, the intersection is
|
|
* non-empty and we * can return immediately.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_find(user_policies,
|
|
node->policy) >= 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
} else if (i > 0) {
|
|
int num_parent_policies =
|
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(node->parent_policies);
|
|
/*
|
|
* |node|'s parents are concrete policies. Mark
|
|
* the parents reachable, to be inspected by the
|
|
* next loop iteration.
|
|
*/
|
|
prev = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, i - 1);
|
|
for (k = 0; k < num_parent_policies; k++) {
|
|
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(prev->nodes))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
parent = x509_policy_level_find(prev,
|
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(node->parent_policies,
|
|
k));
|
|
if (parent != NULL)
|
|
parent->reachable = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
asn1_object_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *const *b)
|
|
{
|
|
return OBJ_cmp(*a, *b);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
X509_policy_check(const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
|
|
const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies,
|
|
unsigned long flags, X509 **out_current_cert)
|
|
{
|
|
*out_current_cert = NULL;
|
|
int ret = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
|
|
X509 *cert;
|
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = NULL;
|
|
X509_POLICY_LEVEL *current_level;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels = NULL;
|
|
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies_sorted = NULL;
|
|
int num_certs = sk_X509_num(certs);
|
|
int is_self_issued, any_policy_allowed;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* Skip policy checking if the chain is just the trust anchor. */
|
|
if (num_certs <= 1)
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
/* See RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, steps (d) through (f). */
|
|
size_t explicit_policy =
|
|
(flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
|
|
size_t inhibit_any_policy =
|
|
(flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
|
|
size_t policy_mapping =
|
|
(flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
|
|
|
|
levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_new_null();
|
|
if (levels == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
for (i = num_certs - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
|
|
if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
is_self_issued = (cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0;
|
|
|
|
if (level == NULL) {
|
|
if (i != num_certs - 2)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
level = x509_policy_level_new();
|
|
if (level == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
level->has_any_policy = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, steps (d) and (e). |any_policy_allowed|
|
|
* is computed as in step (d.2).
|
|
*/
|
|
any_policy_allowed =
|
|
inhibit_any_policy > 0 || (i > 0 && is_self_issued);
|
|
if (!process_certificate_policies(cert, level,
|
|
any_policy_allowed)) {
|
|
ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
|
|
*out_current_cert = cert;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (f). */
|
|
if (explicit_policy == 0 && x509_policy_level_is_empty(level)) {
|
|
ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Insert into the list. */
|
|
if (!sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_push(levels, level))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
current_level = level;
|
|
level = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this is not the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.4.
|
|
* If it is the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.5 instead.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (i != 0) {
|
|
/* RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, steps (a) and (b). */
|
|
level = process_policy_mappings(cert, current_level,
|
|
policy_mapping > 0);
|
|
if (level == NULL) {
|
|
ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
|
|
*out_current_cert = cert;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (h-j) for non-leaves, and
|
|
* section 6.1.5, step (a-b) for leaves. In the leaf case,
|
|
* RFC 5280 says only to update |explicit_policy|, but
|
|
* |policy_mapping| and |inhibit_any_policy| are no
|
|
* longer read at this point, so we use the same process.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (i == 0 || !is_self_issued) {
|
|
if (explicit_policy > 0)
|
|
explicit_policy--;
|
|
if (policy_mapping > 0)
|
|
policy_mapping--;
|
|
if (inhibit_any_policy > 0)
|
|
inhibit_any_policy--;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!process_policy_constraints(cert, &explicit_policy,
|
|
&policy_mapping, &inhibit_any_policy)) {
|
|
ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
|
|
*out_current_cert = cert;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). We do not output the policy set,
|
|
* so it is only necessary to check if the user-constrained-policy-set
|
|
* is not empty.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (explicit_policy == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Build a sorted copy of |user_policies| for more efficient
|
|
* lookup.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (user_policies != NULL) {
|
|
user_policies_sorted = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_dup(
|
|
user_policies);
|
|
if (user_policies_sorted == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
(void)sk_ASN1_OBJECT_set_cmp_func(user_policies_sorted,
|
|
asn1_object_cmp);
|
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_sort(user_policies_sorted);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!has_explicit_policy(levels, user_policies_sorted)) {
|
|
ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
x509_policy_level_free(level);
|
|
/*
|
|
* |user_policies_sorted|'s contents are owned by |user_policies|, so
|
|
* we do not use |sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free|.
|
|
*/
|
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_free(user_policies_sorted);
|
|
sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop_free(levels, x509_policy_level_free);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|